In this paper we consider to use the quantum stabilizer codes as secret sharing schemes for classical secrets. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets in terms of quantum stabilizers. Then we give a Gilbert-Varshamove-type sufficient condition for existence of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and by using that sufficient condition, we show that roughly 19% of participants can be made forbidden independently of the size of classical secret, in particular when an -bit classical secret is shared among participants having 1-qubit share each. We also consider how much information is obtained by an intermediate set and express that amount of information in terms of quantum stabilizers. All the results are stated in terms of linear spaces over finite fields associated with the quantum stabilizers.
Introduction
Secret sharing is a scheme to share a secret among multiple participants so that only qualified sets of participants can reconstruct the secret, while forbidden sets have no information about the secret [31] . A piece of information received by a participant is called a share. A set of participants that is neither qualified nor forbidden is said to be intermediate. Both secret and shares are traditionally classical information. There exists a close connection between secret sharing and classical error-correcting codes [3, 7, 10, 11, 18, 20, 27] .
After the importance of quantum information became well-recognized, secret sharing schemes with quantum shares were proposed [8, 14, 15, 16, 32] . A connection between quantum secret sharing and quantum error-correcting codes has been well-known for many years [8, 14, 32] . Well-known classes of quantum errorcorrecting codes are the CSS codes [6, 33] , the stabilizer codes [4, 5, 13] and their nonbinary generalizations [2, 17, 25] .
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of qualified sets, that of intermediate sets and that of forbidden sets. For practical use of secret sharing, one needs sufficient (and desirably necessary) conditions on qualified sets and forbidden sets. It is natural to investigate access structures of secret sharing schemes constructed from quantum error-correcting codes. For secret sharing schemes with quantum secret and quantum shares, necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified sets and forbidden sets were clarified for the CSS codes [32, 23] and the stabilizer codes [22] . For classical secret and quantum shares, the access structure was clarified in [23, Section 4.1] with [29, Theorem 1] for the CSS codes but has not been clarified for secret sharing schemes based on quantum stabilizer codes, as far as we know.
Advantages of using quantum shares for sharing a classical secret are that we can have smaller size of shares [14, Section 4] , and that we can realize access structures that cannot be realized by classical shares [21, 24] . For example, it is well-known that the size of classical shares cannot be smaller than that of the classical secret in a perfect secret sharing scheme, where perfect means that there is no intermediate set, while ramp or non-perfect means that there exist intermediate sets [34] . On the other hand, the superdense coding can be a secret sharing scheme sharing 2 bits by 2 qubits sent to 2 participants [14, Section 4] . Any participant has no information about the secret, while the 2 participants can reconstruct the secret. We see a perfect threshold scheme sharing 2-bit classical secret by 1-qubit shares. This paper will generalize Gottesman's secret sharing to the arbitrary number of participants and the arbitrary size of classical secrets.
In this paper we give necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets in terms of the underlying linear spaces over finite fields of quantum stabilizers, and give sufficient conditions in terms of a quantity similar to relative generalized Hamming weight [19] of classical linear codes related to the quantum stabilizers. We also consider how much information is obtained by an intermediate set and express that amount of information in terms of the underlying linear spaces of quantum stabilizers. Then we translate our theorems over prime finite fields by the symplectic inner product into arbitrary finite fields, the Euclidean, and the hermitian inner products. Finally we give a Gilbert-Varshamove-type sufficient condition for existence of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and by using that sufficient condition, we show that roughly 19% of participants can be made forbidden independently of the size of classical secret, which cannot be realized by classical shares.
Notations
Let be a prime number, the finite field with elements, and the -dimensional complex linear space. The quantum state space of qudits is denoted by ⊗ with its orthonormal basis {| ⃗⟩ | ⃗ ∈ }.
For two vectors ⃗, ⃗ ∈ , denote by ⟨ ⃗, ⃗ ⟩ the standard Euclidean inner product. For two vectors ( ⃗| ⃗ ) and ( ⃗′ | ⃗′ ) ∈ 2 , we define the standard symplectic inner product
For an -linear space ⊂ 2 , ⟂ denotes its orthogonal space in 2 with respect to ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩ . Throughout this paper we always assume dim = − and ⊆ ⟂ . For ( ⃗| ⃗ ) ∈ 2 , define the × complex unitary matrix ( ⃗) ( ⃗ ) as defined in [17] . An [[ , ] ] quantum stabilizer codes encoding qudits into qudits can be defined as a simultaneous eigenspace of all ( ⃗) ( ⃗ ) (( ⃗| ⃗ ) ∈ ). Unlike [17] we do not require the eigenvalue of to be one.
It is well-known in mathematics [1, Chapter 7] that there always exists ⊆ max ⊆ ⟂ such that max = ⟂ max . Note that max is not unique and usually there are many possible choices of max . We have dim max = and have an isomorphism ∶ → ⟂ ∕ max as linear spaces without inner products. Since max = ⟂ max , max defines an [[ , 0]] quantum stabilizer code 0 . Without loss of generality we may assume 0 ⊂ . Let | ⟩ ∈ 0 be a quantum state vector. Since max = ⟂ max , for a coset ∈ ⟂ ∕ max and ( ⃗| ⃗ ), ( ⃗′ | ⃗′ ) ∈ , ( ⃗) ( ⃗ )| ⟩ and ( ⃗′ ) ( ⃗′ )| ⟩ differ by a constant multiple in and physically express the same quantum state in . By an abuse of notation, for a coset ∈ ⟂ ∕ max we will write | ⟩ to mean
For a given classical secret ⃗ ∈ , we consider the following secret sharing scheme with participants:
corresponds to the classical secret ⃗.
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword | ( ⃗) ⟩ to a participant.
We can also consider a secret sharing scheme for a -qudit secret | ⃗⟩ with participants as follows:
1. Encode a given quantum secret ∑
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword ∑ ⃗∈ ( ⃗)| ( ⃗) ⟩ to a participant.
Let ⊂ {1, . . . , } be a set of shares (or equivalently participants), = {1, . . . , } ⧵ , and Tr the partial trace over . For a density matrix , col( ) denotes its column space. When col( 1 ), . . . , col( ) are orthogonal to each other, that is, = 0 for ≠ , we can distinguish 1 , . . . , by a suitable projective measurement with probability 1.
Definition 1 We say
to be -qualified (classically qualified) if col(Tr (| ( ⃗) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗) |)) and col(Tr (| ( ⃗′ ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗′ ) |)) are orthogonal to each other for different ⃗, ⃗′ ∈ . We say to be -forbidden (classically forbidden) if Tr (| ( ⃗) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗) |) is the same density matrix regardless of classical secret ⃗. By a classical access structure we mean the set of -qualified sets and the set of -forbidden sets.
For a quantum secret, the quantum qualified ( -qualified) sets and the quantum forbidden ( -forbidden) sets are mathematically defined in [29] . By a quantum access structure we mean the set of -qualified sets and the set of -forbidden sets.
Remark 2
When classical shares on is denoted by , the conventional definition of qualifiedness is ( ⃗; ) = ( ⃗) and that of forbiddenness is ( ⃗; ) = 0 [34] , where (⋅) denotes the entropy and (⋅; ⋅) denotes the mutual information [9] .
is the probability distribution of classical secrets ⃗. The quantum counterpart of mutual information for classical messages is the Holevo information ( ⃗; ) [28, Chapter 12] .
is -qualified if and only if ( ⃗; ) = ( ⃗), and is -forbidden if and only if ( ⃗; ) = 0. Therefore, Definition 1 is a natural generalization of the conventional definition in [34] .
Example 3
We will see how one can express the secret sharing scheme based on superdense coding [14, Section 4] by a quantum stabilizer. Let = 2, = 2 and be the zero-dimensional linear space consisting of only the zero vector. Then ⟂ = 4 2 . We choose max as the space spanned by (1, 1|0, 0) and (0, 0|1, 1). For a classical secret ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ 2 2 , define the map as
, which corresponds to the two-bit secret (0, 0). The secret ( 1 , 2 ) is encoded to
It is clear that the share set {1, 2} is -qualified. When = {1} or = {2}, we have
which means {1}, {2} and ∅ are -forbidden. We have determined the classical access structure completely, and we see that this scheme is perfect [34] in the sense that there is no intermediate set.
For completeness we also note its quantum access structure. The set {1, 2} is -qualified and ∅ is -forbidden, of course. By [22, Eq. (3)], we see that {1} and {2} are intermediate, that is, neither qualified nor forbidden. This quantum access structure exemplifies the fact that -qualifiedness implies -qualifiedness, thatforbiddenness implies -forbiddenness and that their converses are generally false [29, Theorems 1 and 2] . It also exemplifies the fact that if quantum secret is larger than quantum shares then the scheme cannot be perfect [8, 14] .
Necessary and sufficient conditions on classically qualified and classically forbidden sets
to be the projection map onto , that is,
Theorem 4 For the secret sharing scheme described in Section 2, is -qualified if and only if
is -forbidden if and only if
The proof is given after showing two examples below. 
. Since ⟂ max = max , any two vectors in a coset ∈ ⟂ ∕ max have the same value of the symplectic inner product against a fixed ( ⃗ | ⃗ ). Suppose that we have two different cosets 1 ,
We have seen that any two different cosets have different symplectic inner product values against some ( ⃗ | ⃗ ). For each , the participants can collectively perform quantum projective measurement corresponding to the eigenspaces of ( ⃗ ) ( ⃗ ) and can determine the symplectic inner product ⟨( ⃗ | ⃗ ), ( ⃗)⟩ as [17, Lemma 5] when the classical secret ⃗. Since ( ⃗ | ⃗ ) has nonzero components only at , the above measurement can be done only by , which means can reconstruct ⃗.
Assume that Eq. (1) is false. Since the orthogonal space of in is isomorphic to ( ⟂ ), which can be seen as the almost same argument as the duality between shortened linear codes and punctured linear codes [30] , we see that dim ( ⟂ )∕ ( max ) < dim ⟂ ∕ max . This means that there exists two different classical secrets ⃗ 1 and ⃗ 2 such that ( ( ⃗ 1 )) = ( ( ⃗ 2 )). This means that the encoding procedures of ⃗ 1 and ⃗ 2 are the exactly the same on and produce the same density matrix on , which shows that is not -qualified.
Assume Eq. (2). Then we have dim ( ⟂ )∕ ( max ) = 0. This means that for all classical messages ⃗, ( ( ⃗)) and their encoding procedures on are the same, which produces the same density matrix on regardless of ⃗. This shows that is -forbidden.
Assume that Eq. (2) is false. Then there exist two different classical secrets ⃗ 1 , ⃗ 2 , and an index such that
This means that the quantum measurement corresponding to ( ⃗ ) ( ⃗ ) gives different outcomes with Tr (| ( ⃗ 1 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 1 ) |) and Tr (| ( ⃗ 2 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 2 ) |), which shows is not -forbidden. [22, Eq. (
Remark 7 A necessary and sufficient condition for being -qualified is
Since ker( ) = we have dim ( ⟂ )∕ ( max ) = . The relation between duals of punctured codes and shortened codes [30] implies dim max ∩ ∕ ∩ = . Therefor Eq. (3) implies Eq. (1) . Similarly, by [14, Corollary 2] , necessary and sufficient condition for being -forbidden is
By a similar argument we see that Eq. (4) implies Eq. (2).
Next we give sufficient conditions in terms of the coset distance [11] or the first relative generalized Hamming weight [19] . To do so, we have to slightly modify them. For ( ⃗| ⃗ ) = ( 1 , . . . , | 1 , . . . , ) ∈ , define its symplectic weight swt( ⃗| ⃗ ) = |{ | ( , ) ≠ (0, 0)}|. For 2 ⊂ 1 ⊂ 2 , we define their coset distance as ( 1 , 2 ) = min{swt( ⃗| ⃗ ) | ( ⃗| ⃗ ) ∈ 1 ⧵ 2 }.
Example 9 Consider the situation in Example 5. We have ( ⟂ , max ) = 1, which implies that 2 shares form a -qualified set. We also have ( max , ) = 2, which implies that 1 share forms a -forbidden set.
and Eq. (2) holds.
Assume that | | ≥ − ( ⟂ , max )+1, or equivalently, | | ≤ ( ⟂ , max )− 1. We have ⟂ ∩ = max ∩ . We also have = ker( ), which means dim ( ⟂ ) − dim ( max ) = dim ⟂ − dim max = . Since dim max ∩ − dim ∩ = dim ( ⟂ ) − dim ( max ) = , we see that Eq. (1) holds with .
Remark 10 By Remark 7 and a similar argument to the last proof, we see that if
| | ≤ ( ⟂ , )−1 then is -forbidden and that if | | ≥ − ( ⟂ , )+1 then is -qualified. Note that these observations can also be deduced from quantum erasure decoding and [14, Corollary 2] and are not novel.
Amount of information possessed by an intermediate set
Let ⊂ {1, . . . , } with ≠ ∅ and ≠ {1, . . . , }. In this section we study the amount of information possessed by .
Lemma 11
For two classical messages ⃗ 1 and ⃗ 2 , we have
and ( ⃗ 2 ) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors in max ∩ , and
• col(Tr (| ( ⃗ 1 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 1 ) |)) and col(Tr (| ( ⃗ 2 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 2 ) |)) are orthogonal to each other if and only if ( ⃗ 1 ) and ( ⃗ 2 ) give different symplectic inner products for some vector ( ⃗| ⃗ ) in max ∩ .
Proof. Assume that ( ⃗ 1 ) and ( ⃗ 2 ) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors in max ∩ . Then we have { ( ⃗| ⃗ ) | ( ⃗| ⃗ ) ∈ ( ⃗ 1 )} = { ( ⃗| ⃗ ) | ( ⃗| ⃗ ) ∈ ( ⃗ 2 )}, and the encoding procedure on is the same for ⃗ 1 and ⃗ 2 , which shows Tr (| ( ⃗ 1 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 1 ) |) = Tr (| ( ⃗ 2 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 2 ) |). Assume that ( ⃗ 1 ) and ( ⃗ 2 ) give different symplectic inner products for some vector ( ⃗| ⃗ ) in max ∩ . Then the quantum measurement corresponding to ( ⃗) ( ⃗ ) can be performed only by the participants in and the outcomes for ( ⃗ 1 ) and ( ⃗ 2 ) are different with probability 1. This means that col(Tr (| ( ⃗ 1 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 1 ) |)) and col(Tr (| ( ⃗ 2 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗ 2 ) |)) are orthogonal to each other.
For a fixed density matrix ∈ Λ, the number of classical secrets ⃗ such that = Tr (| ( ⃗ 1 ) ⟩⟨ ( ⃗) |) is exactly − .
Proof. By the assumption, we have dim max ∩ ∕ ∩ = dim ( ⟂ )∕ ( max ) =
. By the proof of Lemma 11, for two different cosets (⃗ 1 | ⃗ 1 ) + ( max ) and (⃗ 2 | ⃗ 2 ) + ( max ) give two different density matrices on that can be distinguished with probability 1. Therefore the first claim is proved.
The second claim also follows from Lemma 11.
Definition 13
In light of Proposition 12, the amount of information possessed by a set of participants is defined as
Remark 14 When the probability distribution of classical secrets ⃗ is uniform, the quantity in Definition 13 is equal to the Holveo information [28, Chapter 12] counted in log . Firstly, the set Λ in Proposition 12 consists of non-overlapping projection matrices and each matrix commutes with every other matrices in Λ. So the Holevo information is just equal to the classical mutual information [9] between random variable on and random variable on , where is given as a surjective linear function of . Therefore ( ; ) = ( ) − ( | ) ⏟⏞⏟⏞⏟ =0 = .
We say that a secret sharing scheme is -reconstructible if | | ≥ implies has log 2 or more bits of information [12] . We say that a secret sharing scheme is -private if | | ≤ implies has less than log 2 bits of information [12] . In order to express and in terms of combinatorial properties of , we introduce a slightly modified version of the relative generalized Hamming weight [19] .
Definition 15
For two linear spaces 2 ⊂ 1 ⊂ 2 , define the -th relative generalized symplectic weight
Note that 1 = . The following theorem generalizes Theorem 8.
Theorem 16
≥
Example 17
Consider the situation of Example 9. We have 1 ( max , ) = 2 ( max , ) = 2, and 1 ( ⟂ , max ) = 2 ( ⟂ , max ) = 1. Unlike the relative generalized Hamming weight, we do not have the strict monotonicity in of . ( 1,1 , . . . , 1, , 2,1 , . . . , , | 1,1 , . . . , 1, ,
where ( ′ ,1 , . . . , ′ , ) = ( ,1 , . . . , , ) −1 for = 1, . . . , . Ashikhmin and Kinill proved the following.
Proposition 18 [2] Let ⊂ 2 . Then dim −1 ( ) = dim , and −1 ( ) ⟂ = −1 ( ⟂ ), where dim is the dimension of a linear space considered over .
Then we have −1 ( ) ⊂ −1 ( max ) = −1 ( max ) ⟂ ⊂ −1 ( ) ⟂ ⊂ 2 and we can construct a secret sharing scheme by −1 ( ) ⊂ −1 ( max ). It encodes log 2 = log 2 bits of classical secrets ⃗ ∈ into qudits in , which can also be seen as qudits in , where is the -dimensional complex linear space. Let ⊂ {1, . . . , }. By abuse of notation, by we mean {( 1,1 , . . . , 1, , 2,1 , . . . , , | 1,1 , . . . , 1, , 2,1 , . . . , , ) ∈ 2 | , = , = 0 for ∉ and = 1, . . . , }.
We consider each qudit in of the quantum codeword as a share, and examine the property of a share set . We have
Equation (7) The above observation shows that Theorems 4 and 8 also hold for . In addition, Eq. (7) means that a share set has (log 2 × dim max ∩ ∕ ∩ )-bits of information about the secret ⃗ ∈ , also generalizes the proof argument of Theorem 16, and implies that Theorem 16 also holds for . In the sequel we consider a qudit in as each share, and dim means the dimension over .
Translation to the Hamming distance and the hermitian inner product
Many of results in the symplectic construction of quantum error-correcting codes over are translated to 2 -linear codes with the hermitian inner product [2, 17, 25] . For ⃗ ∈ 2 define ⃗ as the component-wise -th power of ⃗. For two vectors ⃗, ⃗ ∈ 2 , define the hermitian inner product as ⟨⃗, ⃗⟩ ℎ = ⟨ ⃗ , ⃗⟩ . For ⊂ 2 , ⟂ℎ denotes the orthogonal space of with respect to the hermitian inner product. Only in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, for ⊂ {1,. . . , }, define = {( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ | = 0 for ∉ }, and define to be the projection map onto , that is, ( 1 , . . . , ) = ( ) ∈ .
Theorem 19 Let
⊂ 2 be an 2 -linear space. We assume dim = ′ and there exists max such that ⊂ max ⊂ ⟂ℎ and max = ⟂ℎ max , which implies dim max = ∕2. Then defines a secret sharing scheme based on the quantum stabilizer defined by encoding
is the coset distance [11] , or equivalently, the first relative generalized Hamming weight [19] .
Proof. The proof is alomost the same as [17] .
Remark 20 As of this writing, it is not clear how one can express and by some combinatorial properties of .
Example 21 Consider the situation in Example 9. Then = {0} and max is the one-dimensional 4 -linear space spanned by (1, 1). 5, 17] , where "⟂ " denotes the Euclidean dual. We have
Translation to the Hamming distance and the Euclidean inner product
Example 22 Example 6 can also be described by 2 
, which gives the standard encoding [6, 33] of the CSS codes. But this choice gives no advantage over the classical secret sharing constructed from linear codes 2 ⊂ 1 [7] . Because the necessary and sufficient condition for -qualified is dim ( 1 )∕ ( 2 ) = dim 1 ∕ 2 and the necessary and sufficient condition for -forbidden is dim ( 1 )∕ ( 2 ) = 0, which are exactly the same [12] as those of the classical secret sharing from 2 ⊂ 1 .
Theorem 24 Let
⊂ be the -linear space. We assume dim = ′ and there exists max such that ⊂ max ⊂ ⟂ and max = ⟂ max , which implies dim max = ∕2. Then defines a secret sharing scheme based on the quantum stabilizer defined by encoding − 2 ′ symbols in .
Proof. The proof is almost the same as [17] .
Example 25 Example 3 is restored by choosing = {0}, ⟂ = 2 2 , ahd max as the 2 -linear space spanned by (1, 1) . Thus we see that Theorem 24 can provide a secret sharing scheme with an advantage over purely classical secret sharing.
Gilbert-Varshamov-type existential condition
In this section, we give a sufficient condition for existence of ⊂ max = ⟂ max ⊂ ⟂ ⊂ 2 , with given parameters.
Theorem 26 If positive integers , , , satisfy
then there exist
Proof. The following argument is similar to the proof of Gilbert-Varshamov bound for stabilizer codes [4] . Let Sp( , ) be the set of invertible matrices on 2 that does not change the values of the symplectic inner product. Let ( ) be the set of pairs of linear spaces ( , ) such that dim = − and
• For nonzero ⃗ 1 , ⃗ 2 ∈ 2 , there exists ∈ Sp( , ) such that ⃗ 1 = ⃗ 2 , and • For ( 1 , 1 ), ( 2 , 2 ) ∈ ( ), there exists ∈ Sp( , ) such that 1 = 2 and 1 = 2 . For nonzero ⃗ 1 , ⃗ 2 ∈ 2 with 1 ⃗ 1 = ⃗ 2 ( 1 ∈ Sp( , )) and some fixed ( 1 , 1 ) ∈ ( ), we have
By a similar argument we also see | ( ,
Similarly we have
If there exists ( , ) ∈ ( ) such that ( , ) ∉ ( , ⃗ 1 ) and ( , ) ∉ ( , ⃗ 2 ) for all 1 ≤ swt(⃗ 1 ) ≤ − 1 and 1 ≤ swt(⃗ 2 ) ≤ − 1 then there exists a pair of ( , ) with the desired properties. The number of ⃗ such that 1 ≤ swt(⃗) ≤ − 1 is given by
By combining Eqs. (9), (10) and (11) we see that Eq. (8) is a sufficient condition for ensuring the existence of ( , ) required in Theorem 26. We will derive an asymptotic form of Theorem 26. 
then there exist ⊂ max ⊂ ⟂ ⊂ 2 such that dim = −⌊ ⌋, ( ⟂ , max ) ≥ ⌊ ⌋ and ( max , ) ≥ ⌊ ⌋.
Proof. Proof can be done by almost the same argument as [26, Section III.C]. Theorem 27 has a striking implication that we can construct a secret sharing scheme with roughly 19% of participants being forbidden independently of the size (i.e. in Theorem 27) of classical secrets for = 2 and large , as ℎ 2 (0.19) + 0.19 log 2 3 ≃ 1. Such properties cannot be realized by classical shares.
Conclusion
In this paper, we considered construction of secret sharing schemes for classical secrets by quantum stabilizer codes, and clarified their access structures, that is, qualified and forbidden sets, in terms of underlying quantum stabilizers. We expressed our findings of in terms of linear spaces over finite fields associated with the quantum stabilizers, and gave sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets in terms of combinatorial parameters of the linear spaces over finite fields. It allowed us to use classical coding theoretic techniques, such as the Gilbert-Varshamov-type argument, and we obtained a sufficient condition for existence of a secret sharing scheme with given parameters. By using that sufficient condition, we demonstrated that there exist infinitely many quantum stabilizers with which associated access structures cannot be realized by any purely classical information processing.
